AntiWar.com, by Gordon Prather
According to the Sunday Times, Sibel Edmonds has revealed to them details – in defiance of several government gag orders – of how this and several previous administrations “monitored”, but did little or nothing to interfere with, the “infiltration” of Western states by “foreign states” seeking “nuclear secrets.”
Edmonds, a fluent speaker of Turkish and Farsi, was recruited by the FBI in
the aftermath of 9/11 to help translate a backlog of recordings – thousands of hours of conversations dating back to 1997 – obtained during an FBI investigation into links between Turks, Pakistanis, Israelis and various Americans, in and out of government.
According to the Times, the Turks and Israelis had planted “moles” in practically every agency or institution involved in nuclear technology. The Turks and their American Turkish Council, Edmonds claimed, often acted as a “conduit,” passing nuclear secrets to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, and receiving cash payments in return.
Sibel Edmonds stumbled onto long-standing treason — by doing her job. Did the “backlog” exist simply because it wasn’t a priority to “know” about such activities?
Way back in 1976, metallurgist AQ Khan, had stolen industrial – not “state” – secrets from Urenco, the world’s leading producer of enriched uranium, and returned to Pakistan. According to the Times, Khan then established a clandestine international network to obtain both materials and technology required for enriching uranium in Pakistan.
Why clandestine?
Well, Pakistan, India and Israel were not signatories to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, not wishing to subject all their activities involving “special nuclear materials” to a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
That wouldn’t be convenient…but it could be made convenient.
[A]s a direct result of India’s underground testing of what it claimed was a “peaceful” nuclear explosive in 1974, the Nuclear Suppliers Group was established.
Comprised of 44 nuclear-supplier states – including China, Russia, and the United States – NSG members voluntarily agreed to coordinate their export controls governing transfers of civilian nuclear material and nuclear-related equipment and technology to non-nuclear-weapon states.
Why do we have the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty…? Isn’t it important?
This is from the Nuclear Suppliers Group website, regarding it’s purpose:
The primary purpose was to ensure that suppliers uniformly applied a comprehensive set of guidelines to ensure that nuclear cooperation did not contribute to proliferation, and to involve a key non-NPT supplier, France….
NSG members encourage all countries to adhere to the NSG Guidelines as the basis for responsible nuclear export policy….Although suppliers consulted regularly on a bilateral basis, the NSG did not meet throughout the 1980s. (emphasis added)
Brilliant.
The NSG has two sets of guidelines.
Part I comprises materials and technology intended specifically for peaceful nuclear use, including fissile materials, nuclear reactors and associated equipment, and nuclear material reprocessing and enrichment equipment.
Part II comprises dual-use equipment that could have nuclear applications, peaceful and otherwise. IAEA safeguards are only required on the specific nuclear activity or facility where the NSG Part II imports will be employed.
Those who are eligible for the import of items from Part I from NSG members do not have to be signatories on the NPT. They convince the NSG that they are using the technology for peaceful purposes, and simply have in place comprehensive IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activity and facilities — effectively going around the NPT.
So, by the time U.S.-Brit intelligence agencies initiated the monitoring program for which Edmonds was translating the backload of intercepts, neither the Pakistanis nor the Israelis were “eligible” to import NSG Part I items.
Furthermore, even though Iran and Libya were “eligible,” the U.S. had effectively prohibited any NSG supplier from selling Iran or Libya Part I or Part II items.
So what were Pakistan, Israel, India, Iran and Libya to do?
This is where AQ Khan’s clandestine operation comes in handy. In the 80s and 90s, Khan was manufacturing and selling off his Pak-1 and Pak-2 modification of the Urenco gas-centrifuge, openly or clandestinely, if preferred.
When Pakistan held its first international arms bazaar in 2000, there was even available at the booth of Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) a Pak-2 brochure, as well as an associated 10-page catalog of specialty vacuum pumps, gauges, high-voltage switches, power supplies, and other equipment.
According to KRL representatives, all the listed items were available for sale and had been approved for export by the Pakistan government.
No wonder the Neo-Cons loves them some Pakistan — they’re so “in your face.”
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